To Fragment or to Consolidate Jurisdictions: the Optimal Architecture of Government by Baleiras, Rui
 To Fragment or to Consolidate Jurisdictions: the Optimal Architecture 
of Government 
 
Rui Nuno Baleiras* 
Faculdade de Economia 
Universidade Nova de Lisboa 
Version of 27 April 2001 
 
ABSTRACT 
 Fiscal decentralisation is a hot issue worldwide. Within the European Union, there 
are even opposing tendencies with respect to the assignment of responsibilities between 
government tiers. This is a textbook paper aiming to provide a pedagogic introduction to 
the economics of government formation. Government size and district boundaries are 
endogenously set. Through a unified diagrammatic framework, the paper stresses the 
impact many politico-economic factors are likely to exert upon those endogenous 
variables. The list includes heterogeneity in demand for and supply of local public goods, 
cost sharing, scale economies, interjurisdictional spillovers, mobility of consumer-voters, 
congestion degrees, governance costs, and second-best finance. The analysis thus provides 
a foundation for a vertical system of multifunction governments very much in the 
pioneering spirit of Mancur Olson and Wallace Oates. 
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1 Introduction 
 Jurisdiction formation has become an important political issue in the last decade. 
Former socialist countries entered a process of fragmentation, many West European 
countries embarked on devolution arrangements, with the empowerment of new, 
intermediate-level governments in some cases, whereas, at the same time, Member States 
have transferred new responsibilities to the supranational level of the European Union. 
Examples outside the continent abound too. 
 These sometimes-dramatic political changes triggered a new interest on fiscal 
federalism ideas. After the pioneering work by Mancur Olson and Wallace Oates in the 
sixties and seventies,1 what contribution can economic theory make nowadays to enlighten 
the rationale behind the fragmentation and consolidation of jurisdictions? 
 We study the allocation function of the public budget and consider what 
government level best serves the provision of a local public good. In this sense, jurisdiction 
fragmentation (consolidation) involves the assignment of the provision responsibility to 
lower (upper)-level governments, i.e., to governments defined over a subset of (set larger 
than) the original community. Jurisdiction fragmentation (consolidation) can thus be 
interpreted as fiscal decentralisation (centralisation) and applies both to political secession 
(integration) movements and to new intergovernmental assignments within given national 
borders. 
 The politico-economic environment clearly influences jurisdiction formations but 
does so in a contradictory fashion. A number of factors push towards greater fiscal 
decentralisation whereas other arguments favour the provision by higher-tier governments. 
Hence, there should be an optimal administration level to deal with a particular 
responsibility. This remark renders district borders and government size endogenous 
variables. 
                                                 
1 Olson (1969) and Oates (1972) are perhaps the founders of fiscal federalism. The current paper owes a lot 
to the spirit of these references. 
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 This paper is part of the author’s ongoing textbook project on the economics of 
multilevel governance. Through a unified framework, it offers a synthesis of the forces 
shaping the optimal jurisdiction size. As this size differs across public goods, the analysis 
provides also a foundation for the vertical architecture of government, with the several 
layers corresponding to different (optimal) jurisdiction sizes. 
 In what follows, we will focus on the expenditure side of the budget and the reader 
may wonder why talking about optimal decentralisation degree without looking with 
similar detail at the revenue side. The reason springs from the fact that expenditure 
decentralisation is the leitmotiv underlying the very existence of subnational governments. 
On the one hand, allocation is the single fiscal function where decentralisation may clearly 
enhance social welfare. On the other, the provision of public goods, either pure or impure, 
makes up most of the allocation function. Revenue decentralisation is basically an 
instrument of expenditure decentralisation, and for two reasons. First, a revenue 
decentralisation goal in itself is meaningless. What sense does it make to enact a local 
government with the single purpose of collecting taxes on behalf of the central 
government? If it makes no expenditure and retains no earnings out of that collection, the 
local authority has no incentive to behave independently. In fact, it would be nothing more 
than an agent of the central government. Second, once the public good provision is 
decentralised, transfers from the central governmental rarely happen to be the optimal 
finance. As we made clear elsewhere,2 a variety of own local revenue is, in general, 
superior. Thus, revenue decentralisation helps to maximise the net benefits of expenditure 
decentralisation; as such, it is an instrument rather than a goal of local governance. 
Anyway, in our optimal government-size framework below, we will find a way to embody 
the welfare contribution of revenue decentralisation. 
 The paper is organised as follows. First, we explain the incentives each individual 
faces to approach someone else for the joint provision of a public good. A collective 
decision to provide one good jointly entails always one benefit and one cost for each 
participating individual. We label them the basic benefits and costs from fiscal 
centralisation. Their matching offers a preliminary approximation to the optimal 
governmental size. Second, one section after another, we will add several new benefit and 
cost elements to the basic framework and see what their impact upon the optimal size is—
these elements are scale economies, interjurisdictional spillovers, population mobility, 
governance costs, and second-best finance. Third, we will assess a few times the so-called 
correspondence principle of fiscal decentralisation. As new elements are brought into the 
                                                 
2 Baleiras (2001), Ch. 6. 
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picture, the correspondence between the government size and the number of individuals 
benefiting from the public good provision becomes increasingly imperfect. 
 For the sake of convenience, the main results are underlined in a proposition layout. 
Their proof is geometric most of the time although an algebraic replica is always feasible. 
Each element entails a utility impact measured by the change in consumer’s surplus. The 
social welfare shock corresponds to the summation of this change across all individuals. 
2 Basic Social Benefits and Costs of Fiscal Centralisation 
 In what follows, we are going to use the individual consumer’s surplus to measure 
welfare changes from varying the price of the public good g. We will assume a quasilinear 
utility function for individual j, 
 U y g y u gj j,c h a f= +    , (1) 
where y j  is individual j’s choice of private good and u( )×  is a twice continuously 
differentiable function with ¢ >u 0  and ¢¢ <u 0 . With function (1) and a given income level, 
the change in consumer’s surplus reflects exactly the utility impact of any price variation. 
Moreover, the (unweighted) summation across all individuals of changes in consumer’s 
surplus is an exact measure of social welfare changes. If the utility function is not 
quasilinear, everything still holds approximately.3 
 When consumers consolidate to consume one good jointly, they face both a utility 
gain and a utility loss. In what follows, we will use the change in consumer’s surplus to 
identify these basic incentives underlying consumer consolidation. 
2.1 The cost-sharing benefit from user pooling 
 Figure 1 displays an individual demand curve for the public good g. When the price 
charged to this consumer (j) decreases from p0  to pN , her surplus increases by the shaded 
trapezoidal area below the demand schedule Dj .
4 
                                                 
3 Additional details in footnote 4. See Varian (1992), pp. 164–166 and 168–169 for proofs. 
4 By definition, the change in consumer’s surplus is measured below the ordinary (or Marshallian) demand 
curve, while the equivalent and the compensating variations of income (two alternative money metric 
functions) are computed below the compensated (or Hicksian) demand curves. For a quasilinear utility 
function, the three welfare change measures are exactly the same because there are no income effects to care 
Continues on next page 
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Figure 1—Individual cost-sharing benefit 
 Let us interpret the two prices in the following way. Suppose p0  is the price 
charged to individual j when she pays the provision cost alone. By sharing this cost with 
other individuals, her charge per unit drops. If the marginal cost remains at p0  and N 
individuals now contribute to financing the provision cost, the price charged to each one 
decreases to p p NN º 0 . The cost sharing of the public good thus gives consumer j a 
utility gain measured by the change in her surplus. This utility gain is higher the larger is 
N, the pool of contributors. If the additional contributors also consume the good, then they 
also enjoy an improvement in their surplus. By summing up the trapezoidal areas across all 
consumers, we get a measure of the social welfare gain. The welfare increases definitely 
with the number of consumers and this effect is captured by curve B in Figure 2. 
 Hence, by consolidating the number of consumers, the individual cost share drops 
and more units of the public good can be consumed by everyone. The aggregate cost-
savings from increasing the number of individuals who jointly finance the provision are 
represented by curve B; its height depicts the sum of the increase in individual consumer’s 
surpluses. Curve B thus displays the social benefits from consumer consolidation or joint 
provision. 
                                                                                                                                                    
Footnotes, continued from previous page 
about—from the Slutsky’s equation, note that this implies the two demand concepts have the same slope. For 
more general utility functions, the change in consumer’s surplus is a reasonable approximation to welfare 
changes as it is always bounded by the equivalent and the compensating variations of income. 
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Figure 2—The basic social benefit from consumer consolidation 
 To understand the slope of curve B, note that its height (like the corresponding 
consumer’s surplus) is proportional to the price drop associated to consolidation. For a 
constant marginal provision cost p0 , the price drop (dN ) is simply 
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 Inequation (2) imposes a positive slope to curve B, while (2) and (3) entail together 
a decreasing positive slope.5, 6 
                                                 
5 The argument we have just made about the cost-sharing benefit from user pooling assumes that all 
consumers equally share the provision cost. This supposition renders the exposition simpler without 
compromising any substance. Curve B can encompass any other cost-sharing agreement provided the 
individual tax introduces no efficiency loss. We will explicitly address distortionary finance in Section 9 
below. 
6 Our analysis up to this point is rigorous in the case of a good with no rivalry at all in consumption. If joint 
consumption somehow makes individual enjoyment smaller that the total output (due to congestion, for 
instance), the welfare gains from consumer consolidation are smaller than what is depicted by curve B in 
Figure 2. We will come back to this case in Subsection 7.2 below. 
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2.2 Dissatisfaction cost with off-bliss provision 
 In deriving curve B, we have assumed that each consumer gets precisely her bliss 
quantity in return for her contribution. Referring back to Figure 1, this means every 
consumer enjoys quantity gN  after paying pN  per unit. However, and in general, when we 
cluster two individuals with different demands and force them to choose the output level to 
consume jointly at price p p2 0 2= , inevitably the selected quantity cannot be the most 
preferred at price p2  for both consumers simultaneously. There is, therefore, a welfare loss 
associated to joining consumers and this loss corresponds to the decrease in aggregate 
consumer’s surplus entailed by a non-bliss consumption level. Figure 3 makes this loss 
clear. For two consumers, let the individual charge be p2  per unit. The bliss quantity of 
individual j is g2 . However, suppose that the bargaining for joint consumption determines 
an actual output of ~g2 .
7 The shaded triangular area below the demand curve gives the 
decrease in consumer j’s surplus imposed by the deviation from the bliss point A. An utility 
loss would also occur should the actual consumption exceed the bliss quantity. Take the 
case of actual ~
~
g2  units: at price p2 , the consumer’s surplus decrease associated to the 
deviation from the bliss point A is represented by the gridded triangular area above the 
demand curve Dj . 
g
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Figure 3—Individual cost from off-bliss provision 
                                                 
7 We do not care about the specific mechanism used to make this collective decision. Whether people vote 
and how they vote for bliss terms is an upstream issue; here, we are just concerned with the outcome of the 
collective decision mechanism, whatever it may be. 
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 We should expect these utility losses to increase with the number of joint 
consumers. The more negotiators are in a club, the less power each has to influence the 
final choice. Moreover, the final choice tends to deviate more from bliss quantities the 
more heterogeneous are the participating consumers. So, for both reasons, it is natural to 
assume that the above triangular areas increase with N. 
 As before, we can aggregate utility changes. By summing up the losses in 
individual consumer’s surplus, across all individuals, we derive a measure of the social 
cost associated to consolidation of consumers. Such welfare cost is depicted by curve C in 
Figure 4. Naturally, this cost is nil when only one consumer gets the delivered output 
because, in this case, she consumes exactly what she most wants at the prevailing price—
as is always the case with a private good. However, as explained above, the social cost 
increases with the size of consolidation, thus leading to a positive slope. If the 
dissatisfaction with actual output within a large group is higher than within a small group, 
then the slope of curve C increases with N, as displayed in Figure 4—this is quite natural 
given the smaller individual bargaining power and wider demand diversity within larger 
groups.8 
N
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Figure 4—The basic social cost from consumer consolidation 
 Note that the dissatisfaction cost curve (C-curve) represents precisely the 
motivation for jurisdictional fragmentation underlying the decentralisation theorem—Oates 
(1972), p. 35. Such motivation is the spatial heterogeneity in demand. Indeed, it is this 
variety that leads to off-bliss provisions. If individual demands were all the same 
                                                 
8 The strict convexity is not crucial; a linear C-curve would be enough in the sequel. 
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nationwide, everybody should be consuming on their own demand curves and so the 
provision would please everyone. 
3 Optimal-Sized Government: the Basic Case 
 A number of assumptions are convenient to introduce at this stage. First, suppose 
there is a constant and geographically immobile population in the country. Second, there 
are no costs associated to collective decision-making. Third, the financing method selected 
to cover the provision cost does not engender any efficiency loss in the economy. We will 
dispense with these quite extreme hypotheses later on but, for the moment, they are useful 
to stress the major message of this paper. The reader will notice that these assumptions are 
embodied in the decentralisation theorem. 
 Under this framework, and given the social benefit and the social cost identified in 
the previous section, we can determine the welfare-maximising number of consumers of a 
particular public good. This first result is formalised in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1—The optimal government size: The socially optimal government size to 
provide a given public good is the number of consumers ( N * ) that maximises social 
welfare from consumer consolidation. 
Proof: See Figure 5 and accompanying text.  
N
Euros
B
C
N *
 
Figure 5—Optimal government size for a particular public good 
 In geometric terms, the social welfare from consumer consolidation is the vertical 
distance between curves B and C. This distance is maximal for population size N * . Figure 
5 makes very clear the trade-off inherent to any collective consumption. On the one hand, 
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merging consumers allows for cost sharing for everyone and this obviously boosts social 
welfare. On the other hand, the larger the group of consumers is, the more the actual 
provision terms (price and quantity) deviate from the individual bliss terms and so the 
lower the social welfare becomes. From a social perspective, the provision terms for this 
good should be decided within the group of N *  consumers. As there is a correspondence 
between group size and geographic areas (given population immobility), we are simply 
stating that the optimal jurisdiction to provide this collective good is a territory with N *  
residents. This is the socially tailored government size to deal with the good provision. 
 We can even add that the group size N *  is Pareto efficient. This is done in the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 2—Efficiency and optimal size of government: The welfare-maximising 
government size is Pareto-efficient. 
Proof: The social welfare (W) is a function of individual utilities, W W u uN= 1 , ,Kb g with 
¶ ¶ >W u j 0 . Let N W
* arg max= . Suppose N *  is not efficient. Then, there exists a 
community size $N  for which at least one individual is better off and no one else is worse 
off. Therefore, W N W N
$ *d i c h>  by monotonicity of W ×a f , which simply means N *  does not 
maximise social welfare—a contradiction.   
 So a welfare-maximising community size is Pareto efficient. Any addition or 
subtraction (of consumers) to this number is not a Pareto movement because at least one 
individual becomes worse off. This is why social welfare decreases. Note that we have 
been using an additive social welfare function in this paper,9 which is simply a particular 
case of W W u uN= 1 , ,Kb g. The social welfare from consolidation underlying Figure 5 sums 
these individual utilities across all individuals. Thus, when this sum decreases after the 
addition or subtraction of one consumer, it is sure that at least someone within the involved 
group becomes worse off, thus rendering the move inefficient. 
 Naturally, other public goods have different patterns of benefit and cost. Figure 6 
displays three other examples. 
                                                 
9 W u j
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N
=
=
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Panel (i): severe demand heterogeneity Panel (ii): global versus local public good 
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Panel (iii): pure private good 
Figure 6—Optimal government sizes for different public goods 
 For the good in Panel (i), the cost from consolidation increases sharply after a 
relatively small group is attained; social welfare is maximal at government size N * . This 
cost pattern is predictable, for example, in the presence of considerable demand 
heterogeneity. Remember the decentralisation theorem stresses precisely the spatial 
diversity in demand to legitimate fiscal decentralisation. If, on the contrary, all individual 
demands were alike, everyone would be consuming at their bliss point and the social cost 
from consolidation would be nil for all N. The optimal government size to provide such 
good would correspond to the maximal social benefit—case not shown. 
 For a worldwide public good (anti-drug fight, for instance), the benefits curve 
extends well beyond the total population in the country, Nn . As shown in Panel (ii) by 
curve Bw , it is always possible to find additional individuals within the country willing to 
join the pool as all benefit from the good provision. By construction, the optimal 
jurisdiction size corresponds to the national population Nn  but it would not be difficult to 
conceive less severe dissatisfaction costs calling for supra-national governments. By 
contrast, a local public good benefits only a subset of the national population. After this 
threshold, say Nl , is attained, no one else is drawable towards the pool. Curve B would 
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thus be truncated at Nl  in this case as is represented by schedule Bl  in Panel (ii). The 
optimal-sized jurisdiction counts N *  individuals and is thus a subset of the nation. The 
local public good should therefore be provided out of several governments each sized N * . 
 Finally, take the case of a purely private good. The cost from consolidation is as 
usual: having the individual consumption level decided collectively engenders off-bliss 
dissatisfaction for every group member. The contrast lies with social benefit. In fact, 
adding-up consumers does not affect the terms of trade offered to any individual within the 
group. Referring back to Figure 1, consumer j does not face any price reduction or quantity 
increase when other participants are joined. This is so because further members will not 
consume the very same units enjoyed by individual j. Each additional consumer requires 
additional output units to be provided, as there is rivalry in consumption. Therefore, for a 
constant marginal cost, the price charged to j remains p0  no matter how many individuals 
consume the good. In terms of social welfare from consolidation, this translates to a B-
curve coincident with the horizontal axis, as shown in Panel (iii). Obviously, this 
represents the extreme case of fiscal decentralisation, a situation where the optimal size of 
government ( N * ) is the individual. 
4 The Correspondence Principle and a Federal System of Government 
 In the preceding discussion, the optimal-sized group is made of people that benefit 
from the public good provision. More strongly, the set of beneficiaries and the set of 
decision-makers overlap perfectly. For a geographically fixed population, a group size 
translates immediately to a spatial area (jurisdiction).10 Social welfare is therefore maximal 
when the provision of collective goods is decided within the jurisdictions over which their 
benefits are defined. Wallace Oates has termed this situation as one of perfect 
correspondence between the government’s jurisdiction and the number of individuals who 
benefit from the government’s decision-making. In his own words, “(…) under such a 
perfect correspondence, each government unit provides that level of consumption that 
equates at the margin the sum of the benefits and costs to its constituency.”11 
 As the previous section made clear, the benefits and costs of government 
consolidation depend upon the public good at stake. Each collective good calls for a 
                                                 
10 Hence, when we say a collection of individuals decides the provision terms of a collective good, we are 
simply stating their jurisdiction over the spatial area where they reside. 
11 Oates (1972), p. 48. 
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specific government size to decide on its provision terms. At one extreme, there are goods 
whose optimal jurisdiction is quite small, requesting many similar-sized government units 
around the country. At the other extreme, we may find goods that are best handled by a 
single, large government with jurisdiction over all consumers—in the country, the 
European Union or other supra-national spaces. A whole spectrum of multiple 
intermediate-sized governments fills in the gap between these two polar cases. 
 Therefore, the correspondence principle we have been elaborating points for a 
federal system of government, that is, a governmental architecture where the jurisdiction of 
each unit matches exactly the group of consumers benefiting from the collective good it 
provides. 
 The case of perfect correspondence is embodied in the decentralisation theorem. In 
fact, its hypotheses are the assumptions we have been using so far. However, as explained 
in Baleiras (2001), Sc. 5.2, there are reasons to cast doubt on their plausibility. In what 
follows, we are going to remove these assumptions one by one and see how the 
endogenous government size changes. At the end, we will reassess the correspondence 
principle and the vindication of a federal governmental architecture. 
5 Scale Economies 
 Let us first remove the assumption of a constant marginal provision cost. Many 
services typically provided by governments are subject to increasing returns to scale at 
least over a relevant range. 
 In Figure 1, the adding-up of consumers allowed for cost sharing among the group 
members: reduction in individual prices from p0  to pN . Note however that augmenting the 
club size does not allow for scale economies exploitation and the concomitant cost 
reduction. Implicit in all our discussion has been the non-rivalry in consumption nature of 
the collective good. In fact, we have assumed throughout the domains of curves B and C 
that everyone is consuming the very same quantity. So, the consolidation of consumers 
does not lead to any output expansion and so no scale economies are actually ripped off. 
Therefore, the mere existence of scale economies in the technology does not mean 
automatically that society may profit from them. The way people co-consume the good 
matters also. 
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 In fact, one case where scale economies make a difference happens when the good 
is subject to some degree of congestion or rivalry in consumption—mixed good.12 In this 
case, further individuals will only be willing to pay for the provision if its output increases. 
Yet, there is another case where scale economies can be enjoyed and non-rivalry prevails: 
the local public good case. Here, there is non-rivalry within the jurisdictional units but the 
provision benefits stop at the borders. Still, when two or more jurisdictions merge to 
provide the good jointly, scale economies become feasible. We will assess the two cases in 
what follows. 
5.1 The mixed good case 
 Take a collective good subject to some rivalry in consumption and scale economies 
in provision over the relevant range. The following result holds. 
Proposition 3—Scale economies and optimal government size in the case of a mixed 
good: If the provision of a mixed good is subject to scale economies, the welfare-
maximising government size is larger than when the marginal provision cost is constant 
over the relevant output range. 
Proof: see Figures 7–8 below and the accompanying text.  
g
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Figure 7—Change in consumer's surplus due to scale economies 
 As the output expands to accommodate a larger pool of consumers, the marginal 
cost drops. Recovering our previous notation, let p0  be the marginal cost corresponding to 
                                                 
12 A mixed good is an intermediate case between a public and a private good—rivalry is neither nil nor full. 
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a single consumer. The marginal cost with N consumers is ¢p0 , ¢ <p p0 0  reflecting the cost 
reduction. Hence, the relevant price charged to each of the N consumers is now ¢pN  in 
Figure 7, where ¢ = ¢p p NN 0 . 
 The gridded trapezoidal area measures the individual benefit from scale economies. 
It adds to the previous utility gain (shaded trapezoidal area) associated to cost sharing and 
identified before in Figure 1. Aggregating over all consumers, we derive a larger social 
benefit from consolidation, as displayed in Figure 8 below. Curve B rotates upwards to 
position ¢B  reflecting larger gains in consumer’s surpluses. 
N
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Figure 8— Scale economies and the optimal government size 
 For a given social cost schedule, the optimal government size increases to N ¢* . 
Note that the correspondence principle still means a perfect correspondence between the 
government size and the number of people benefiting from the good it provides. This is no 
longer true in the case below of merged jurisdictions and local public goods. 
5.2 The local public good case 
 For immobile population, a quantity of consumers corresponds to a territory size. 
The local public good, by definition, benefits people residing within a given territory or 
geographic space only. The benefits stop at the jurisdiction’s edge— nobody benefits from 
the provision beyond this threshold distance. Contrary to a mixed good, in this case there is 
no rivalry at all in consumption within the jurisdiction where the good is provided. Hence, 
the consolidation of consumers up to the threshold distance involves no output expansion 
and so no marginal cost reduction. 
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 Nevertheless, if several jurisdictions decide to merge and form a single government 
to provide the good to the various consumer groups, the operational scale necessarily 
expands—there is rivalry between the former jurisdictions. Therefore, scale economies 
become available to all consolidated consumers and the following outcome arises. 
Proposition 4—Scale economies and the optimally-sized governemnt in the case of a 
local public good: If the provision of a local public good is subject to scale economies, and 
jurisdictions merge into a single government, then the welfare-maximising government 
size is larger than when the marginal provision cost is constant over the relevant range. 
Proof: Figures 7–8 apply again. The optimal group size is necessarily bigger (N ¢*  instead 
of N * ), reflecting the consolidation of jurisdictions explained before.  
 The joint provision by the single, after-merge government corresponds to the 
typical provision by a central government. In this case, and contrary to the mixed good 
one, the correspondence principle no longer reads as perfect overlapping between the 
government size and the group of provision beneficiaries. Now, the enlarged jurisdiction is 
made of several groups, which means that the other groups influence the output provision 
for one particular group—the government’s jurisdiction no longer corresponds perfectly to 
the geographic area of benefit (of each local public good). 
 Having stated that, we must however acknowledge that the imperfect 
correspondence just derived is not inescapable in the case of a local public good. It is 
inevitable only when the isolated jurisdictions decide to merge and set a single 
government. However, a horizontal co-operation may secure the scale economies while 
keeping the perfect correspondence. 
Proposition 5—Scale economies and optimal coalition of independent governments in 
the case of a local public good: If the provision of a local public good is subject to scale 
economies, public procurement by a coalition of independent jurisdictions improves 
welfare. 
Proof: We just need to reinterpret the variables. Let N *  represent the size of each 
independent jurisdiction and N ¢* the optimal size of the coalition. From Figure 8 and the 
maximum definition, total welfare is higher with N ¢*  than with N * .  
 Proposition 5 thus refers to a set-up where local governments keep their sovereignty 
but co-operate in a joint procurement programme. This scenario looks plausible when the 
production and provision activities are separated and scale economies lie with the former 
alone. Under these circumstances, a common procurement agreement among the concerned 
jurisdictions may well secure the same cost advantages for everyone as an order placed by 
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a consolidated, single government. Such agreement may even allow for some discretion in 
provision terms across the participating jurisdictions. Hence, each government’s 
jurisdiction continues to overlap perfectly the geographic area of provision benefit. 
6 Interjurisdictional Spillovers 
 If the provision of a collective good by one group of consumers13 spills over into 
the utility of another group, then the curves B and C no longer fully reflect the social 
welfare associated to that provision. This is true whether the provision benefits or harms 
external consumers. Without the internalisation of this external effect, those people who 
decide the output level do not represent all relevant consumers—again, a case of imperfect 
correspondence. 
 In general, the smaller the group within which the provision is decided, the more 
the external effects are disregarded. To put it another way, when an external individual 
enters the club, her interests are no longer external to the club—they get internalised. 
Hence, this consolidation entails a welfare gain. So, the larger the group, the more the 
external effects get internalised and the more social benefits increase. This is representable 
by an upward rotation of the benefits curve to position ¢B  in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9—Interjurisdictional spillovers and the optimal government size 
                                                 
13 A group of consumers corresponds to a jurisdiction, given population immobility and the concomitant 
correspondence between collections of individuals and geographic areas or territory sizes. 
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 The height between schedules B and ¢B  measures the social gain associated to the 
internalisation of the externality and pushes towards larger jurisdictions. Such 
consolidation however exacerbates the loss from off-bliss consumptions. Proposition 6 
states the resultant trade-off. 
Proposition 6—Interjurisdictional spillovers and the optimal government size: If the 
provision of a public good spills over benefits or costs to external residents, and these 
effects are taken into consideration by the provision decision, the welfare-maximising 
government size is larger than when the external effects are disregarded. 
Proof: See the Appendix for a proof of the upward rotation of the B-curve in Figure 9. For 
a linear or strictly convex dissatisfaction cost curve (C-curve in Figure 9), the result is 
immediate: N N¢ >* * .  
 So, in light of spatial externalities, efficiency calls for a larger club size, a move 
towards greater centralisation. The perfect correspondence between a government’s 
jurisdiction and benefit areas is preserved once consumers merge to internalise spillovers. 
This is no longer true with exogenous borders and co-operative decentralisation. In this 
case, the jurisdiction that causes the externality does not contain all consumers of the 
public good. The external beneficiaries reside outside that jurisdiction and so the 
correspondence between government size and geographic area of consumption becomes 
imperfect. 
7 Geographic Mobility of Population 
 We have already noted that if individual demands were all alike across the country 
the costs from consolidation would be nil and the socially optimal jurisdiction would be the 
entire nation—full centralisation would then provide the efficient output level. It is our 
purpose in this section to stress that the gains from decentralisation depend both on the 
degree of demand heterogeneity in the country as a whole and on the degree of demand 
heterogeneity within the jurisdictions that decide output provision. To make this point 
clear, and to begin with, suppose that the two degrees are the same, i.e. the heterogeneity 
within geographically separated groups of consumers is the same as in the nation as a 
whole. Then the C-curve is an upward-sloping line, like in Figure 10. Adding one resident 
to a group of 10,000 individuals increases collective dissatisfaction with the provision 
terms as much as when one further resident is appended to a group of 100,000 people—this 
explains the linearity of curve C. 
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Figure 10—Voting with feet and the optimal government size 
 By contrast, imagine that people are distributed in space such that the diversity in 
individual demands is higher in the country as a whole than within each collection of 
residents—each jurisdiction. This would be the case if the new residents added first to each 
group were those with demands closer to the original residents. Under these circumstances, 
as N expands the marginal cost from consolidation increases too, leading to a total cost 
curve as ¢C  in Figure 10. Within smaller groups, individual demands are now much 
similar and so the individual welfare losses from off-bliss consumptions (the triangular 
areas in Figure 3, p. 6) get reduced. As the group size expands to integrate more diverse 
individuals, these losses increase. These changes in consumers’ surplus explain why curve 
¢C  passes below curve C for small groups and above it for large groups. 
 It is now clear why the decentralisation net gains are enhanced once people cluster 
as described in the previous paragraph, i.e. such that the demand heterogeneity within 
jurisdictions gets smaller than in the country as a whole. For small groups ( N N< ~ ), 
welfare increases by the vertical distance between curves ¢C and C. 
7.1 Voting with feet 
 Why does all this discussion matter for the analysis of mobility? It matters to the 
extent that mobility is one way people have to countervail their dissatisfaction with the 
provision terms they are receiving in their current jurisdictions. If someone feels powerless 
to influence the collective decision-making according to her preferences, she can always 
vote with her feet, that is, moving away to another jurisdiction where better terms are 
offered. Inasmuch as people behave in this way, we should expect smaller demand variety 
within groups and greater demand diversity in the country as a whole. The more mobile 
people are, the more convex becomes the dissatisfaction curve. For example, in Figure 10 
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curve ¢¢C  portrays higher mobility than curve ¢C . Mobility thus pressures towards larger 
jurisdictions ( N N¢¢ ¢>* * ). 
 Actually, Charles Tiebout first predicted this behaviour of consumer-voters in his 
classic paper Tiebout (1956). Households observe the particular expenditure-revenue 
package offered by each jurisdiction and take them into consideration when deciding 
where to locate. Inasmuch as people are sensitive to local fiscal deals, we should indeed 
expect them to cluster according to preferences. Demand heterogeneity would then tend to 
be smaller within rather than between jurisdictions. 
7.2 Congestion 
 So spatial mobility cuts the social losses from consolidation and this leads to 
somewhat larger optimal jurisdictions. However, mobility may also affect the social 
benefits from consolidation. This is certainly the case when the good is subject to some 
degree of congestion and the exclusion of consumers is unfeasible. Take the example of a 
swimming pool. It is true that group members benefit from the inclusion of additional 
partners through reduced cost shares. However, after a certain size, the facility becomes 
crowded, and each member finds not enough space to swim at ease.14 
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Figure 11—The individual congestion cost of mobility 
                                                 
14 The swimming pool is a famous example of a congestionable collective good after the seminal paper by 
James Buchanan—Buchanan (1965). This article lays down the foundations for an economic theory of clubs 
and uses the swimming pool to illustrate the reasoning. 
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 Technically speaking, the individual marginal benefit decreases after that size is 
reached. Geometrically, this means the individual demand curve shifts downward when the 
facility becomes crowded—output level ~g  in Figure 11. The gain in consumer’s surplus 
due to consolidation is now smaller, being reduced by the amount of the gridded area. 
 In aggregate, this entails a downward rotation of the benefits curve in Figure 12, at 
least after a threshold size ~N  is attained. Hence, to the extent congestion costs are 
plausible, the optimal government size is reduced. In the real world there are not many 
public goods truly with no rivalry at all in consumption. Most exhibit some crowding 
effects after a while. Thus, talking about mobility-induced congestion is not mere rhetoric. 
Whereas a private club can bar the admission of new members at any time and so control 
for the congestion, the same is unlikely in a public club, a jurisdiction. In fact, contrary to a 
private club, jurisdictions are normally open clubs. This is so because it is not politically 
right to fence a territory and deny further immigration.15 
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Figure 12—Spatial mobility and the welfare from consolidation 
 We can go back to Figure 12 for a summary. Household mobility exerts a 
contradictory influence upon the optimal government size. The more we believe people 
                                                 
15 In practice, however, there are a few subtle ways to exclude consumers and so to limit the congestion 
damages. Zoning regulations at the local level are one such mean. For example, when the local government 
imposes a minimum land consumption per household in a particular neighbourhood, it raises the price of land 
and housing in that location. This obviously excludes the poorest families. At a national scale, we can also 
find examples of consumers’ exclusion. The European Union is very attractive to East-European workers at 
the turn of the millennium. Faced with an ageing population, EU governments realise the output benefits of a 
larger working force. However, a massive immigration may lead to xenophobic feelings by the natives, 
which looks like some sort of congestion cost. This explains why labour movements between EU and Eastern 
Europe are not free. 
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chose their location according to local fiscal proposals, the larger are the net gains from 
decentralisation. The more crowded becomes the consumption of the collective good, the 
less bright emerge the merits of decentralisation. Again, the optimal government size is a 
case study, as the following proposition puts forward. 
Proposition 7—Spatial mobility and the optimal government size: Household mobility 
across space induces an ambiguous impact upon the welfare-maximising government size. 
Proof: Spatial mobility leads to two contradictory effects. On the one hand, voting with 
feet choices reduce the marginal cost from consolidation for all N, thus calling for a larger 
optimal size. On the other hand, a larger size potentialises facility crowding, which reduces 
the marginal benefit from consolidation and calls for a smaller optimal size. The ultimate 
impact on optimal N is qualitatively ambiguous.  
8 Costs of Governance 
 Up until now, we have ignored the specific costs associated to collective decision-
making. This is not realistic. Once people cluster to consume jointly, they need to build up 
and maintain an institutional set-up where the decisions about provision terms are made. 
From a single-person committee serving as agent for a one hundred people assembly to a 
complex structure of public agencies managed by professional staff and chaired by 
officials elected by one billion people, a whole array of institutional set-ups is foreseeable. 
 Let us coin the “governance costs” label to name the costs of implementing and 
keeping in force the institutional set-up. Without the organisation, no collective decisions 
are made and therefore no public provision of goods will ever occur. So the governance 
costs refer to the costs of collective decision-making. We can think of three kinds of 
governance costs: operational costs, entropy costs and rent-seeking costs. 
8.1 Operational costs 
 Operational costs include the salaries of staff and elected officials, office space and 
equipment rentals, other office input expenditures, the cost of holding elections, referenda 
and other media to hearing people’s voice, etc. In a word, operational costs refer to the 
direct costs of government. They are essentially fixed costs—once a government unit is set 
up, they emerge. The smaller is the scale of provision, the larger is the number of 
government units required to dispense the good nationwide and so the higher these 
operational costs (OC) are. Curve OC in Figure 13 illustrates the path of operational costs 
as a function of the jurisdiction size. The declining pattern reflects the fact that these costs 
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are basically expenditure in fixed inputs, more or less proportional to the number of 
governments providing the good in the country. 
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Figure 13—The governance costs 
8.2 Entropy costs 
 In a federal system of government, the several decision-making units have to talk 
and negotiate a number of issues. One possible hot topic is the share of tax bases. Should a 
particular tax base, say personal income, be assigned to the central government or to a 
myriad of small government units? Let the discussion of such topic be open and the 
controversy will be endless. In general, subnational governments are likely to react to 
every central decision with non-uniform spatial repercussions. With losing and winning 
communities, the subnational governments will get involved in disputes among themselves 
and with the central government. The fewer the subnational units are, the larger each one is 
and so the stronger its bargaining power will be. This potentialises confliction, more 
entropy within the general government. More entropy renders collective decision-making 
more expensive. Curve EC in Figure 13 illustrates the shape of entropy costs. These costs 
are relatively insignificant when the good is provided out of many small, local government 
units with virtually no individual bargaining power. As the provision scale expands, and 
the number of political players diminishes, the entropy is likely to rise within the general 
government. After reaching a peak with just a few, powerful regional governments, it 
declines to zero, when the provision is fully centralised. With a sound economic 
constitution, where rules prevail over discretion in policy-making involving spatial 
repercussions, these costs can be substantially contained. 
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8.3 Rent-seeking costs 
 Finally, there are rent-seeking costs to care about. Often, the costs of a policy 
decision are not distributed by individuals the same way as benefits are. When the latter are 
concentrated on just a few and the costs are borne by many others, we should expect 
lobbying activities by the few beneficiaries in favour of a larger provision. Public subsidies 
to a particular industry illustrate the argument. To the extent that the final outcome fails to 
match social benefits with social costs, lobbying creates inefficiency in the economy. This 
welfare loss is felt within the community where lobbying acts but it may harm other 
jurisdictions as well, thus imposing an even more severe welfare loss. Take the case where 
lobbying is more successful in some jurisdictions than in others; then, we may well expect 
interregional price differences without an efficiency support. These distortions are 
obviously a welfare loss we must account for when assessing governance costs. 
 In principle, the smaller a government unit is, the more vulnerable to lobbying it 
becomes. Again, this is a matter of relative bargaining power, now between a public 
authority and a private body. The stronger the latter is vis-à-vis the former, the more rents 
it expects to extract from approaching the government.16 Hence, the rent-seeking costs of 
governance tend to evolve with government size as displayed by curve RSC in Figure 13: 
high with small-size governments (because the number of weak governments is large), low 
with large-size governments (small number of stronger governments). This pattern reflects 
two things: first, the decline in likelihood of lobbying activities as N increases, which was 
referred above;17 second, the decline of the inefficiency size compared to a measure of the 
community’s economy.18 Note that we are not referring to lobbying activities in general. 
We are solely speaking about the rent-seeking activity addressed to the public good 
provision under discussion. 
                                                 
16 There is a vast literature on rent seeking that has motivated these ideas about governance costs. Tullock 
(1967) and Krueger (1974) are founding theoretical contributions. Interesting recent applications to multi-
level governance include Baumgardner (1993), Renaud and van Winden (1991) and Dougan and Kenyon 
(1988). Interestingly, the work by Bardhan and Mookherjee (1999) addresses the relative vulnerability of 
local and central governments to pressure groups. 
17 It costs more to bribe or otherwise influence the decision of a large rather than a small government, ceteris 
paribus; thus, the quantity demanded diminishes as N increases. 
18 A subsidy to one entrepreneur in a community of one thousand people may generate a larger loss in per 
capita real income than all lobbying outcomes at the national scale. 
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8.4 Total costs 
 By adding up the three cost components, we can finally derive the total governance 
costs (TGC) as a function of government size. They are represented by curve TGC in 
Figure 13.19 Summing these costs to our already familiar dissatisfaction cost (curve C), we 
derive the total costs from consolidation as curve ¢C  in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14— Governance costs and the optimal government size 
 Once governance costs are taken into scrutiny, the merits of fiscal decentralisation 
turn pale. Note that the rise in total costs from consolidation covers the whole population 
but strikes stronger the smaller is the scale of government. Not surprisingly though, the 
optimal government size with governance costs increases, say from N *  to N ¢* .20 
Proposition 8 makes this clear. 
Proposition 8—Governance costs and the optimal government size: with downward-
sloping total governance costs, the welfare-maximising government size is larger than 
when no such costs exist. 
Proof: Figure 15 helps to establish the result. Negative marginal governance costs 
(d TGC d N , curve not displayed) places the total marginal cost curve (dC dN d TGC dN+ ) 
definitely below the original marginal cost from consolidation curve (dC d N ) for all N. 
                                                 
19 From a qualitative viewpoint, we have no argument to decide on the precise shape of the cost component 
curves or their relative positions. However, this ambiguity is inconsequent for our analysis —see Proposition 
8 below. An empirical study may perhaps resolve the ambiguity, at least for particular applications. 
20 N ¢*  is the community size that maximises the vertical distance between curves B and ¢C  in Figure 14. 
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The intersection with the marginal benefit curve (d B d N ) necessarily occurs at the right 
of the intersection between schedules d B d N  and dC d N . 
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Figure 15—Optimal government size in the space of marginal benefits and costs  
 This result is independent of the relative position of all curves. The TGC decrease 
with N, making the associated marginal cost negative over the entire domain. This suffices 
to establish the result. 
9 Second-Best Finance 
 In computing the social gains and losses from consolidation via the changes in 
consumers’ surplus, we have assumed the provision was paid through head taxes. Hence, 
there were no efficiency costs21 associated to revenue raising. What if this first-best finance 
is not feasible? For one reason, scale economies inhibit full funding through marginal cost 
pricing; if the deficit is paid out of distortionary taxation, there is a welfare loss to be 
accounted for. For another reason, consumers may fail to reveal their true demands for 
public goods if they know that individual cost shares are endogenous in the level of 
consumption. This is the well-known problem with Lindahl taxation, which leads to 
underprovision of the public good, again a welfare loss we have ignored so far.22 
 Whatever the reason, there are specific welfare losses to consider when second-best 
finance is required. Of course, the inefficiency severity will depend on the circumstances at 
                                                 
21 Other than the dissatisfaction costs entailed by off-bliss provision terms. 
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stake, namely the kind of revenue instrument. This is made very clear in Part III of Baleiras 
(2001), where we provide an extensive analysis of most revenue instruments typically 
available to subnational governments. Let us just consider two examples to give the flavour 
of what is at issue. In example 1 below, we will figure out how the efficiency costs of 
personal income taxation evolve with government size. A similar exercise is performed for 
benefit taxation in example 2. 
 Example 1: personal income taxation. As we make clear in Baleiras (2001), Sc. 
4.2, redistribution in presence of significant household mobility calls for substantial 
government consolidation. Inasmuch as a personal income tax contains redistributive 
elements (and virtually all actual systems do contains such elements), richer households 
will try to avoid their burden by moving away to cheaper tax jurisdictions. Suppose the 
personal income tax is administered independently by a collection of subnational 
governments. In order to collect a given revenue target, an individual government has to 
raise the tax rate high enough to compensate for the base outflow. But this attitude 
increases the excess burden for remaining taxpayers. So, the higher is the mobility of 
taxpayers across jurisdictions, the larger is the efficiency loss necessary to meet the 
revenue target. As mobility across many and small jurisdictions is higher than across few 
and large jurisdictions, the total efficiency loss of this tax decreases with N, the size of the 
government. Curve FC1  in Figure 16 illustrates the efficiency loss path associated to 
example 1, where the initials “FC” stand for (social) finance costs. 
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Figure 16—Examples of finance cost patterns 
                                                                                                                                                    
Footnotes, continued from previous page 
22 Actually, a head tax when individual demands are equal corresponds to a Lindahl tax. 
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 Example 2: local benefit taxation. Local governments are closer to consumers of 
local public goods and have an informational advantage over higher-level governments 
about individual willingnesses to pay and provision costs. Suppose benefit taxation is a 
feasible finance instrument.23 Given this information advantage, we may presume that the 
welfare losses associated to benefit taxation increase as the community enlarges and the 
number of providers reduces. Hence, the finance costs in this case increase with N—curve 
FC2  in Figure 16. 
 The following proposition sets the link with the optimal government structure. 
Proposition 9—Second-best finance and the optimal governmnent size: The efficiency 
costs of second-best finance exert a qualitatively indeterminate impact upon the welfare-
maximising government size. 
Proof: The total costs from consolidation add up the by now familiar dissatisfaction cost 
(C) with the relevant finance cost (FC). The two examples FC1  and FC2  suffice to 
establish the indeterminacy. With the downward-sloping FC1  curve, the marginal total 
costs curve shifts downward and the optimal N increases. However, with the upward-
sloping FC2  curve, the marginal total costs curve shifts upward and the optimal N 
decreases, thus proving the qualitative indeterminacy.   
 At this level of generality, it is thus impossible to predict the ultimate impact of 
finance costs upon the optimal government size. However, we may expect a larger optimal 
size and fewer government units when these costs are declining (as FC1), and smaller 
optimal size and more government units in the opposite case (the FC2  example). This is so 
because the gains from decentralisation deteriorate in the former case and improve in the 
latter. 
 Once a government finances a local public good provision by anything but user 
charges and benefit taxation, the set of consumers no longer corresponds to the set of 
contributors. This is particularly evident in the case of intergovernmental transfers. The 
grant received by a local government A is taxpayers’ money levied all over the country. To 
the extent that this revenue is raised through distortionary taxation, most efficiency loss 
associated to second-best finance is borne by non-residents. As the subsidised good 
benefits A-residents only, we find again an imperfect correspondence between the size of 
                                                 
23 The feasibility of benefit taxation is discussed in Baleiras (2001), Sc. 7.1. 
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the jurisdiction where provision terms (quantity and payment) are decided and the number 
of individuals who benefit from the good. 
10 A Pragmatic Synthesis: System of Multifunction Governments 
 The size of jurisdictions where the provision terms of individual public goods 
should be decided is endogenous. This endogenousness stems from a complex array of 
reasons. In this paper, we have thoroughly examined the driving forces of jurisdiction 
formation. On the one hand, factors like demand (and supply) heterogeneity, congestion 
and welfare losses from some kind of second-best finance call for the fragmentation of 
jurisdictions. On the other hand, user-pooling cost savings, scale economies, 
interjurisdictional spillovers, voting with feet behaviour, governance costs, and welfare 
losses from another kind of second-best finance pressure towards jurisdiction 
consolidation. Whereas the size of government corresponds exactly to the number of 
beneficiaries from the good it provides when only demand (and supply) heterogeneity and 
cost-share savings are considered, the correspondence gets increasingly imperfect once the 
other factors are added up to the design of governmental architecture. 
 Although important in practice, most of these benefits and costs from consolidation 
are hard to assess empirically. Moreover, their relative importance varies a lot with the 
good whose provision we are studying. This is why the optimal government size depends a 
great deal on the assigned function. A hypothetical distribution of optimal sizes for single-
function governments is presented along the line in Figure 17. The national population 
sums N  individuals. Good 1 calls for the smallest government size ( N1) and the largest 
number of providing units across the national territory. By contrast, the optimal size to 
provide good 8 encompasses the total national population and a fraction of neighbouring 
foreigners; a single, national government should decide on its provision terms and co-
operate with the neighbouring national government. The empirical difficulties with the 
measurement of optimal sizes may prevent the analyst from identifying exactly the right 
jurisdiction scale. However, sensitivity and good wisdom in the appraisal of relevant 
benefits and costs from consolidation will certainly help to predict whether the ideal size is 
closer to one extreme or the other in the line of Figure 17. 
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Figure 17—Hypothetical distribution of optimal-sized single-function governments 
 Furthermore, we should expect to find interactions between several functions, 
namely in the case of governance costs. For some goods, with slightly different optimal 
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government sizes, the same fixed inputs of governance capacity enable their joint 
provision. This is the case when there are scope economies; by reducing the total provision 
cost associated to a set of public goods, scope economies are a persuasive argument in 
favour of multifunction governments. 
 Given scope economies with function consolidation and the inherent uncertainty 
with single-function optimal size estimates, a pragmatic approach will likely recommend 
the formation of multifunction governments. Applying pragmatism to the hypothetical 
distribution in Figure 17, one would perhaps be content with a three-layer governmental 
architecture. At the bottom, a layer made of many small governments each responsible for 
the provision terms of goods 1, 2 and 3. Fewer government units with larger jurisdictions 
would make up an intermediate layer, with each unit responding for the provision terms of 
goods 4 and 5. At the top, a single-government layer accountable for goods 6, 7 and 8 over 
the entire national territory.24 Curiously, this three-layer hypothetical architecture is often 
the governmental architecture actually found in many countries: one central government, 
up to a few tens of regional, state or provincial governments, and up to a few thousands of 
local, county, municipal or parochial governments. A fourth layer is increasingly evident in 
the European Union. In fact, following the principle of subsidiarity, Member States are 
transferring to an emerging supranational government (the Union) the provision terms of 
cross-border goods, like good 8 in Figure 17. Hence, federalism in public finance is a fact 
of life all over the world no matter how political federalism may lag behind the scene. 
11 Appendix—Partial Proof of Proposition 6 
 In this section we prove the upward rotation of the B-curve in Figure 9, p. 16. The 
rest of the demonstration is on the main text, next to the proposition. 
 To begin with, the social gain associated to the spillover internalisation is traced 
back to the usual changes in consumers’ surplus. This is done in Figure 18 below where a 
negative externality is illustrated—mutatis mutandis, the argument applies to positive 
externalities as well. The private marginal benefit enjoyed by N individuals is represented 
by the negatively sloped curve PMgB . This schedule is the vertical aggregation of the N 
individual demand curves Dj  ( j N= 1, ,K ). For a constant social marginal cost (see curve 
                                                 
24 For a formal analysis of this point, see Hochman et al. (1995). The authors combine space with the 
conventional analysis of local public goods provision to address the case where the market areas for different 
goods overlap. They show that the efficient outputs can be decentralised through local authorities having 
Continues on next page 
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SMgC ), the private optimum requires the provision of g p  units of the public good. 
However, the remaining population, i.e., the individuals external to the Nth-sized club do 
not esteem this good, as is understood by their collective negative marginal benefit—curve 
D N- . Hence, the aggregate marginal benefit corresponding to all (internal and external) 
consumers is given by the social marginal benefit ( SMgB ) curve. Note that this curve lies 
below the private marginal benefit curve. Therefore, the socially optimal output ( ge ) is 
smaller than the private one ( g p ). The output cut to ge  units improves net social benefit, 
or social welfare, by the shaded triangular area. This area is precisely the vertical distance 
between curves ¢B  and B for population size N in Figure 9. The greater the externality 
(i.e., the larger the triangular area in Figure 18), the higher is the distance between curves 
¢B  and B. 
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Figure 18—The welfare gain from the internalisation of external consumers 
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